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Abstract
Forensic investigations of digital devices is generally conducted on a seized device in a secure environment.
This usually necessitates powering down the device and taking an image of the hard drive or semi-permanent
storage in the case of solid state technology. Guidelines for forensic investigations of computers advise that the
computer should be shut down by removing the power supply and thereby maintaining the hard disk in the state
it was in whilst running. However, valuable forensic evidence often exists in the volatile memory which is lost
when this process is followed. The issues of locked accounts on running computers and encrypted files present
particular difficulties for forensic investigators who wish to capture a forensic image of the RAM. This research
involves freezing RAM removed from a running computer so that it can later be reinserted into an unlocked
computer allowing for a forensic image of the RAM to be captured. Three different methods of cooling the RAM
are compared, along with varying delays in RAM reinsertion. The results provide a guideline for forensic
investigators on how the issues with locked accounts and encryption may be overcome to record this valuable
evidence that is otherwise lost.
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INTRODUCTION
The forensic investigation of digital devices usually involves an investigator examining a cell phone, tablet of
computer hard disk in a sterile environment. Guidelines for forensic investigators often advise that if a computer
is running, it should be switched off at the power source to preserve the hard drive in its current state (National
Institute of Justice 2008). One authoritative guide for forensic investigations suggested the need to preserve all
evidence yet then suggested that power should be removed immediately from a running computer. This was
corrected in a later version where a greater recognition of the value of evidence in the memory was recognised.
(Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 2012). Shutting down the computer using the normal method will
inevitably cause data to be written to the hard drive possibly overwriting valuable forensic evidence from
deleted files (Vidas 2007). Whilst this method focusses on the potential forensic evidence on a hard drive, the
Random Access Memory (RAM) is often overlooked as a source of forensic evidence. RAM may contain highly
valuable forensic data such as web browsing history, programs that have been recently run or werecurrently
running and usernames and passwords in unencrypted form (Halderman, Schoen et al. 2009). This highly
valuable and useful information will be lost the instant power is switched off to the computer (Simon and Slay
2009).
It is fairly trivial to insert a USB drive with the required software to download the contents of RAM on to an
external drive for later analysis. Whilst often this is not done, the fact that RAM may contain several gigabytes
of valuable forensic evidence means that evidence is lost because the forensic investigator has not considered
this area to be valuable to an investigation. One problem that may arise for an investigator is that of a computer
that has been locked by the user and requires a password to unlock the user account. Whilst this may not present
a problem in recovering hard drive evidence, the shutting down of the computer will permanently delete the
volatile evidence in memory. Another significant issue that has surfaced in recent years for forensic
investigators is the increasing use of cryptographic tools to encrypt files or entire hard drives. The cryptography
is generally robust enough to withstand all attempts at finding the encryption key required to unlock this
evidence. A securely encrypted drive means that evidence can be seized but that it simply cannot be read
rendering it useless.
This research examines the area of RAM forensics as an important source of digital forensic evidence for
investigators. Methods of freezing RAM are utilised to compare the retention of data within the RAM utilising
three different methods. Results are then compared so that guidelines for forensic investigators are presented
allowing recovery of RAM contents using these methods.
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STATE OF THE ART
The physical address space consists of all valid physical memory addresses that are readable by the CPU (Intel
Corporation 2013). The Memory Management Unit (MMU) acts as an intermediary between the operating
system and the memory so that any attempt at acquiring the contents of RAM will require the utilised software
to overcome restrictions created by the MMU. Whilst the utilisation of address spaces may vary across
architectures and operating systems, the address spaces in RAM are all potentially accessible through
specialised software.
The layout of the physical address space in RAM is finalised upon completion of the copying of firmware code
from ROM to RAM (Salihun 2012). Once this is complete, the RAM is ready for use by the operating system.
Some forensic guidelines suggest photographing a computer screen and then switching the computer off at the
power supply but forensic investigators are often aware of the valuable evidence contained in RAM and suggest
performing a memory dump prior to powering off the system (Ligh, Case et al. 2014). Whilst a memory dump
of RAM should provide all contents of RAM, it is possible that memory smear may occur because of the time
taken to acquire the RAM contents (Vömel and Freiling 2012). Memory smear occurs when memory is copied
from RAM to a physical media and during this process some errors occur because of the time taken for the
acquisition. This results in minor differences between the RAM contents and the RAM image so that whilst a
100% match of the contents is hoped for, often the image falls slightly below a 100% match.
To overcome this problem, a hardware-based approach using a Firewire connection can be utilised which
provides more direct access to RAM, decreasing the error rate to the point that often a 100% match can be
achieved (Huebner, Bem et al. 2007). If the Firewire approach is not feasible and the computer is running a
Windows operating system, then 2 other methods may provide greater reliability than a memory dump (Ruff
2008). Firstly, intentionally crashing the operating system will cause the RAM contents to be copied to the hard
disk meaning a forensic acquisition of the hard disk should include most, if not all of the contents of RAM. The
drawback to this method on a Windows Operating System is that the same computer must be rebooted to allow
memory to be rewritten to the RAM (Russinovich, Solomon et al. 2012). The second method is to utilise the
hibernation feature which will copy the contents of RAM to the hard disk and then power down the computer.
Whilst Firewire may provide greater reliability in copying memory to external storage, and the other methods
suggested may provide sufficient integrity of the data for Windows Operating Systems, the forensic investigator
may be in a position where these options are not available. Additionally, these options won’t work if the
computer has been locked by the user so that access to the RAM is not available. This problem is common and
whilst asking for the password may be an option, a legally savvy suspect will likely refuse to give the password.
Furthermore, full disk encryption is becoming more commonplace with freely available software such as
TrueCrypt that will encrypt all files on a disk rendering them unreadable unless the password is disclosed that
will decrypt the files. One issue that may also present to investigators during the memory acquisition phase is a
deliberate attempt to corrupt the contents of memory if a memory dump is attempted. Specialised software
designed to corrupt the memory can be created and will run when the memory is dumped from the operating
system (Milkovic 2012). This can be overcome if the anti-forensic can be disabled or the RAM can be removed
and inserted into another, similar but clean computer.
In 2016, an experiment was run in freezing RAM using freezing spray (Bauer, Gruhn & Freiling, 2016). In this
experiment the RAM was cooled insitu with the computer running. The focus on the experiments was to
demonstrate the recovery of the data and how it could be unscrambled to produce an original image or file.
Unlike the current experiments, it did not utilise cooling with liquid nitrogen or ice and so has a different focus
than this research.
The following section describes the experiments in cooling RAM so that the forensic investigator can remove
the ram yet maintain the integrity of the data for a sufficient period of time to permit forensic analysis of the
contents.

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The problem for forensic investigators of locked user accounts means that RAM cannot be examined because an
unlocked computer is required to examine and download RAM. The computer is locked by the user selecting
‘ctrl alt delete’ which then requires that same user’s password to be entered to unlock the computer. What is
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therefore required from a forensic investigator is the ability to remove RAM from a locked computer without
losing the integrity of the digital contents and to either place the RAM into an identical computer or to reboot
the suspect computer into a state where it is not locked. The RAM can then be inserted into the unlocked
computer and a memory dump performed. The first stage in the experiments was to boot a laptop computer to
the Windows 7 operating system. This system was chosen as it remains one of the most common operating
systems in organisations and for home users. Six actions were then performed to provide data in the 1 GB RAM
that would be useful in an investigation.
Those actions were:
1. Log on to Windows 7 with the administrator username and password.
2. Open a text file and copied text to the clipboard.
3. Started an Apache HTTP web server and MySQL database.
4. Unlocked a TrueCrypt file container and opened several files from the container.
5. Executed several commands using a DOS prompt.
6. Launched a web browser and logged into a Facebook account.

The process for calculating the percentage of data recovered was to take an image of the RAM and then to lock
the account on the computer. The power button was then held down to halt power to the motherboard and the
RAM removed at the same time where it was immediately put through the cooling process. Once the full
experiment was completed and a RAM image obtained, this image was then compared to the prior image and
the percentage of data recovered calculated.
Whilst this gives an accurate percentage of the data recovered, it does so at a macro level so that if parts of files
are recovered or even parts of passwords, this is not obvious from the percentages that are recovered. To
ascertain at a micro level, a more manual examination is required and in the case of recovered passwords this
was done to ensure that a full password or encryption key has been recovered. The parameters for the test bed
are shown in table 1:
Table 1: Testbed Setup
Item
Description
RAM

1GB DDR3

Error
Correction?

Non Error Correction RAM

CPU

Samsung 2.4GHz

The experiments with freezing RAM to recover its contents began with a baseline to compare the results against.
The baseline simply involved removing RAM from a computer and inserting the RAM into the now unlocked
and rebooted computer. The minimum time between removal of the RAM and insertion into the computer was
10 minutes, allowing ample time for the investigator to reboot the machine to a usable state.
The surface temperature of the RAM was measured at 35 degrees centigrade. As expected, the contents of RAM
were deleted upon removal so that no usable forensic evidence could be recovered using this method.
Table 2 shows the experimental setup for the RAM utilising three different cooling methods. The ambient
temperature of the RAM before cooling was 35° degrees centigrade.
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Table 2: RAM Freezing Experimental Steps
Temperature
Time
Method
Cooled
Delay
degrees C
Liquid
Nitrogen

10mins, 1
hr, 2hrs

-196

Freezing
Spray

10 mins

-40

ICE

10 mins

10

The next step was to utilise liquid nitrogen to freeze the RAM. This has been attempted by previous researchers
with good results. The RAM was removed from the running but locked computer and immediately submerged in
liquid nitrogen, almost instantly freezing the RAM and it was hoped that the contents would therefore remain.
The surface temperature of the RAM was measured at -196 degrees centigrade. The experiment was repeated a
number of times with varying longer delays in removing the RAM from the liquid nitrogen to see of entropy of
the contents occurred. The experiment was then repeated but with a spray of freezing compressed air rather than
liquid nitrogen. The freezing by compressed air was a simple process and could easily be performed by a
forensic investigator in the field as opposed to the practicality of carrying liquid nitrogen to an investigation
scene. The surface temperature of the RAM was measured at -40 degrees centigrade. Finally, the third stage
involved removing the RAM, placing it in an anti-static bag and burying it in ice cubes for 10 minutes. The
surface temperature was measured at 10 degrees centigrade just immediately after removing it from the ice.
Once cooled, the RAM was then reinserted into the same computer and the computer booted from a USB stick
with DumpIT, a Linux memory dumping software programme installed on the stick which creates an image of
the RAM. In the initial boot stages, the software immediately dumped the contents of the RAM onto a storage
area on the USB stick where it remained for later analysis. The results of the RAM cooling are described below.

RESULTS
The purpose of the experiments was to ascertain whether freezing RAM with compressed air or ice would
provide forensic evidence from the RAM that could be utilised in an investigation. It was ascertained that
removing RAM and reinserting it 10 minutes later led to almost all contents being deleted. The liquid nitrogen
provided results that led to almost a complete recovery of the RAM but was not practical for a forensic
investigation in the field. Therefore, the freezing spray and submergence in ice were of particular interest as
these methods are both feasible for an investigator. A can of freezing spray is easily obtainable for negligible
cost and ice may be available if a forensic investigator has no freezing spray readably available. The following
table shows the results in percentage of data recovered from RAM after 10 minutes.
Table 3: Percentage of forensic data recovered
Temperature
Percentage
Method
degrees
Recovered
Celsius
No cooling
35
0.2%
Liquid Nitrogen
-196
99.81%
Freezing Spray
-40
96.45%
Ice
10
99.71%
The results indicated that whilst liquid nitrogen performed the best, submerging the RAM in ice was a very
close second best with only 0.1% less data recovered. Freezing spray, whilst the most practical for a forensic
investigator to carry in their toolkit, results in 96.45% data recovered. Whilst this result is significant, the 3.3%
data not recovered compared to ice may be vital evidence that would be lost when choosing this method. Next,
the results for submerging the RAM in liquid nitrogen were extended from previous experiments by allowing
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for a much greater delay in submerging the RAM and removing it from the liquid nitrogen. The purpose of these
further experiments were to simulate a forensic investigator who is equipped with a container of liquid nitrogen
who may be able to simple drop the RAM into the container but may require a sterile and safe environment
equipped with protective clothing to remove the RAM from the nitrogen. The time delay was therefore
extended from 10 minutes to 1 hour and then repeated for a delay of 2.5 hours. The results are shown in table 4.
Table 4: Time delay with liquid nitrogen
Percentage
Time delay
Difference
Recovered
10 minutes

99.81%

1 hour

98.84%

-0.97%

2.5 hours

93.95%

-4.89%

It is clear from table 4 that even at -196% Celsius data is lost from RAM if there is a delay in reinserting the
RAM into an unlocked computer. A delay of 1 hour results in a loss of over 1% more data than by utilising a
freezing spray. If a delay of 2.5 hours occurs, then the loss exceeds the freezing spray by 2.5%. A delay of 1
hour may be unrealistic in many scenarios where the submergence of RAM would be followed by seizing of the
computer and related activities, meaning that returning to a safely equipped laboratory may well take longer
than 60 minutes. The delay of 2.5 hours is more realistic and shows a significant loss of valuable data. The
rather low loss of 0.29% of data with ice indicates that this is the preferred method. It shows that loss of data is
minimal and it is a very safe method, although somewhat cumbersome for the forensic investigator in the field.
The preferred method may be to carry a can of compressed air as this is simple and fairly safe, but the forensic
investigator must bear in mind that approximately 3.55% of data will be lost with a delay of only 10 minutes.
Finally, the data that was recovered from the RAM was identified. A USB drive with Linux software suitable
for a RAM dump was used to store the RAM image. Among the data recovered was the expected information
regarding user activities on the computer including web pages visited and processes that were started and
stopped. Of particular interest was whether the TrueCrypt password could be recovered. It was found in all
experiments that the 512 bit AES encryption key utilised by TrueCrypt was recovered allowing the encrypted
files to be decrypted and read. This is particularly important for the forensic investigator because it is often the
encrypted files that contain the most vital information for the forensic investigator. The recovery of the
encryption key was possible in all experiments involving cooling of the RAM but with less than 100% of data
recovered there was some luck involved. Any data that is lost may by bad luck involve the encryption key or
other vital evidence and so the forensic investigator should bear this in mind when selecting which method to
utilise. The greater the percentage of data recovered, the greater the likelihood that the most vital data will
remain in the RAM image.

CONCLUSION
The purpose of a forensic investigation of a computer is to acquire, analyse and potentially use information in a
criminal, civil or employee investigation. The more information that can be gleaned from the device, the higher
the likelihood of a successful investigation. Traditional methods of preserving information from a running
computer usually involve looking at the screen to ascertain running programs and then removing the power to
the device to preserve the information on the hard disk. Often, the valuable forensic information in RAM is
overlooked, or thought to be unobtainable because of a locked user account or encrypted files that prevent the
investigator from reading the files unless the encryption key can be obtained. This is unlikely if the suspect’s
computer contains malicious or nefarious evidence of wrongdoing. The ability to secure the RAM image is
therefore highly valuable to the forensic investigator.
This research provides evidence that RAM images can be obtained in these circumstances, and in the case of
TrueCrypt encryption, the encryption key may be able to be recovered from the image of memory. This research
provides a guideline for forensic investigators as to the best methods for a successful data recovery of RAM and
provides evidence of the importance of time delays in the entropy of information in the case of liquid nitrogen
freezing. The importance of memory forensics should not be overlooked by the forensic investigator and the
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implementation of account locking or encryption of files or entire volumes does not present an insurmountable
challenge to successfully acquiring a RAM image.
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